Judicial Federal Structure In India: An Investigation Between Constitutional Morality And Political Expediency

Judicial federalism in India occupies a critical position within a constitutional framework, marked by a strong Union and politically contested centre–state relations. As the final arbiter of constitutional disputes, the Supreme Court plays a decisive role in mediating federal balance. This article examines how the SC’s approach to judicial federalism has evolved in the context of increasing political centralisation, through the competing lenses of constitutional morality and political expediency. Employing a purposive qualitative case study method, the paper analyses three landmark decisions - S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994), the Ayodhya verdict (2019), and the abrogation of Article 370 (2023). These cases represent distinct judicial postures ranging from constitutional assertion to accommodative restraint and judicial abdication. This analysis reveals an uneven and context-dependent judicial engagement with federal principles, where constitutional morality is often acknowledged rhetorically but inconsistently enforced in practice. This article argues that political expediency increasingly shapes judicial outcomes, with significant implications for state autonomy, democratic accountability and the future of cooperative federalism in India. By tracing this trajectory, this study contributes to the broader debates on the role of constitutional courts in sustaining federalism under conditions of political dominance and constitutional stress.